Introduction Hutchings et al. (1997) claim that non-science influences can interfere with the dissemination of scientific information and the conduct of science in the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). To substantiate their claim, they quote from a number of documents published over a 10-year period. This comment responds to Hutchings et al. (1997) by describing the open system of peer review of stock assessments in DFO and by showing how misinterpretation and selective quotation gave a false impression of stock assessments of northern cod in the 1980s and 1990s and of the peer review process in DFO.
DFO peer review system for stock assessments Hutchings et al. (1997) allude to deficiencies in the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC) process yet fail to acknowledge that CAFSAC was replaced by a new stock assessment review process in 1993. DFO's fisheries science is conducted in a rigorous, transparent, and collaborative fashion. DFO's peer review system for stock assessment is among the most open in the world. To obtain the information needed for analysis, DFO conducts research vessel surveys and monitors fisheries. Oceanographic and environmental information are also gathered. People outside DFO with relevant knowledge and information are brought into the process. For example, commercial fishermen conduct some mini-stock surveys and carry out Sentinel surveys in closed cod fisheries.
A multidisciplinary teamwork approach is basic to DFO stock assessments. Data are analyzed by teams with members drawn from DFO and outside. Stock assessments are reviewed in meetings of scientists and fishers. These meetings include university-based scientists and fishers knowledgeable of the stocks. These participants from outside DFO see all of the data, analyses, and results. Once discussion is complete, stock status reports are completed, reflecting the results of the peer review. The text of these documents is reviewed and agreed upon as part of the peer review process. Stock status reports receive final editing at the Canadian Stock Assessment Secretariat.
Working papers are revised to reflect the discussions and are then made publicly available as research documents. Proceedings of the assessment meetings are produced. These proceedings reflect the differing opinions put forward during the meetings. Reasons for accepting or rejecting different analyses are included. These proceedings are available to the public.
External participants in peer review meetings know the results of stock assessments before DFO managers or the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. Such an open system is not vulnerable to the kind of tampering that Hutchings et al. (1997) claim is occurring.
In the case of Atlantic groundfish, DFO's stock status reports are made public and are provided to the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC). This arm's-length body is composed of individuals experienced in the fishery and university-based scientists, together with ex-officio members from provincial governments and DFO. The FRCC reviews scientific information from DFO and consults publicly across Atlantic Canada and Quebec before recommending conservation measures to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. A similar council for the Pacific has been initiated via a CanadaBritish Columbia agreement and is planned to begin operations in early 1998. pointed out in the peer review meeting at the time, there was no inshore fishermen's strike in 1981. It occurred in 1980 (Union Forum 1981 . When the 1981 point is included in the analysis, the correlation is no longer statistically significant. This is not "an excellent example of the incompatibility of government bureaucracy and normal scientific inquiry," as Hutchings et al. (1997) proclaim, but rather a case of an error that was detected in peer review. Other parts of Winters' working paper were reflected in the CAFSAC advice (e.g., p. 5).
Was it normal to quantify uncertainties in stock assessments in 1986? Not at all. NOAA (1986), which contains scientific advice on fishery resources off the northeastern United States, presents point estimates of parameters such as stock biomass and fishing moralities without confidence intervals. The same is true for the northeast Atlantic (ICES 1986). Presenting confidence limits in stock status reports is a practice of the 1990s. Restrepo et al. (1992) , a group of U.S. scientists and DFO scientists, using the same data available to CAFSAC in 1990, carried out a comprehensive risk assessment that suggested, based on the 1990 data, that the probability of the 1991 fishing mortality on northern cod exceeding the 1990 value was less than 0.05 (Fig. 2, Alverson Hutchings et al. (1997) quote selectively from the independent review by Alverson et al. (1987) . What Alverson et al. (1987) said about the growth of the stock was "Estimates of the growth of the stock may have been overly optimistic, and although we conclude that the total stock has increased since 1977, it has not reached the expected levels. Nevertheless it currently appears to be increasing, but at a slow rate" (pp. 1-2). Alverson et al. (1987) estimated a 5-fold increase in stock size between 1976 and 1986, whereas CAFSAC scientists had estimated a 5.5-fold increase over the same period (Lear and Parsons 1993) . This means that they did not agree with the Keats report (Keats et al. 1986 ), which they had received and which Hutchings et al. (1997) argue DFO was remiss in treating. What Alverson et al. (1987) said about fishing mortality was "The assessment methodologies employed by the fishery center at St. John's should lead to reasonably accurate estimates of stock abundance. The CAFSAC estimates of fishing mortality in 1986 fall within the (0.2-0.4) range of estimates supported by the data, but at the lower end of the range accepted by the Task Group and estimates made between 1976 and 1986 proved to be too low. Our selection of VPA methodology which leads to a less optimistic growth of the stock(s) reflects (i) our concern over the NAFO consistent underestimation of F, and (ii) our judgement as to the methodology which is not only consistent with available data but which takes into account the underlying uncertainties and risk associated with such estimates" (p. 3).
The independent Task Group introduced methods of calibrating VPA not previously used for northern cod, leading to different and, judged in retrospect, better estimates. The Task Group made no mention of any "bureaucratic influence" or any other conjecture to explain why their estimates differed from those of CAFSAC. Better methods give better estimates.
Harris Hutchings et al. (1997) make no mention of the Independent review of the state of the northern cod stock (Harris 1990 ). This review was commissioned by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans after CAFSAC provided substantially reduced estimates of the abundance of northern cod in 1989. The omission is unfortunate because Harris (1990) puts in perspective the assessments of the mid-1980s. As noted by Hutchings et al. (1997) , the research vessel survey for groundfish in Divisions 2J + 3KL increased dramatically in 1986 over 1985. The 1986 survey was completed in the late fall and was used in the following year's assessment. The high survey value in 1986 was seen as corroborating the increasing offshore commercial catch rates and confirming the stock estimates from use of commercial catch rates. This changed when the 1987 survey was sharply lower. In 1988, estimates based on the survey could not be reconciled with estimates based on commercial catch rates, which continued to increase. CAFSAC delayed their assessment until January 1989 to use the results of the 1988 fall survey. Once the 1988 survey data were available, it was clear that the commercial catch rates were not proportional to stock abundance and reliance was put on the research vessel series (Lear and Parsons 1993) .
What did the Independent Review say about the 1989 CAF-SAC assessment? "… we accept the current CAFSAC estimate of fishing mortality at 0.44 as being most probably in the right domain" (p. 135).
The Independent Review adopted the CAFSAC assessment as a basis for catch projections. Contrary to popular recollection, Harris (1990) did not recommend closing the fishery. What he recommended was that "there should be an immediate reduction of fishing mortality to the level of at least 0.3 and, at the earliest feasible date to the level 0.2" (p. 151).
1992 projection of northern cod Hutchings et al. (1997) criticize a projection of spawning stock biomass included in the 1992 announcement of the moratorium on fishing northern cod (DFO 1992) . The NAFO Scientific Council assessed northern cod in June 1992. Their assessment included estimates of the number of fish at each age in the population. The calculation that Hutchings et al. (1997) criticized was a straightforward projection of the peerreviewed population estimates by NAFO. It is ironic that Hutchings et al. (1997) attack this projection. It assumed no fishing mortality because the fishery was closed and no increase in natural mortality, which Hutchings seems to be advocating in his papers, including the May perspective article. Their reference to the intrinsic rate of increase, r, is illfounded because the projected increase of spawning biomass was due to the growth and maturation of the 1986 and 1987 year-classes already present (aged 6 and 5, respectively, in 1992) and estimated at the time to be quite strong. The lower values of the parameter r quoted for cod generally reflect long-term averages.
In retrospect, it is clear that the spawning biomass did not increase as projected and as advised in the NAFO Scientific Council Report (NAFO 1992, p. 44) . The fall research vessel survey, which is the main indicator of stock abundance used by DFO and others, continued to decline sharply in 1992, 1993, and 1994 (Fig. 1) . The continuing rapid decline of the research vessel survey with apparent year-to-year total mortalities above 1.0 after the fishery closed suggests natural mortality was high in the early 1990s.
Media relations guidelines
DFO's Media Relations Guidelines 2 are similar to those of other government departments. The current guidelines state: "Public servants should be prepared to openly provide factual information to the public and the media within their areas of responsibility that describes or explains programs or policies that have been announced or implemented by the government. To contribute to open government, such interviews shall be on the record and for attribution. … Public servants should not go beyond this discussion of factual information. …" DFO scientists have given hundreds of interviews over the past few years following these guidelines and with no prior approval by managers. To the best of our knowledge, no scientist in DFO has received a letter of reprimand for following these guidelines.
In addition, DFO has identified spokespersons to speak for the department on some issues. This is intended to avoid mixed messages and to ensure that spokespersons are familiar with the broad background of an issue and have the necessary skills to communicate clearly and effectively. Hutchings et al. (1997) take issue with the letter of reprimand given to a DFO scientist for making the following statement in a Globe and Mail interview, August 25, 1995:
"There are two messages in the research" said Department of Fisheries and Oceans research scientist Ransom Myers, who was the lead author of the study, "Decimated fish populations like the northern cod will recover if fishing is cut down … and what happened to the (East coast) fish stocks had nothing to do with the environment, nothing to do with seals. It is simply overfishing."
The scientist attributed this to Myers et al. (1995) . In fact, there is no such statement in this 1995 paper. To the extent that Myers et al. (1995) address environment and ecosystem effects on fish stocks, they take quite a different view. It states "The implication is that reductions in fishing mortality rates implemented by resource managers should enable currently remaining stocks to rebuild, unless environmental or ecosystem-level changes occur that alter the underlying dynamics of the stock" (p. 1108).
Significantly, Hutchings et al. (1997) justify the statement, not by referring to Myers et al. (1995) , the subject of the August 25, 1995, interview with the Globe and Mail, but by reference to 14 other published papers, of which 10 were published in 1996 or later.
Elsewhere in their article (p. 1198), Hutchings et al. (1997) criticize DFO scientists for "failure to acknowledge fully scientific uncertainty and variability in scientific opinion." It is illogical for these authors to demand full acknowledgement of scientific uncertainty by departmental scientists and then to condemn the Department for pointing out to a scientist who makes a categorical and extreme statement that his statement did not give a balanced perspective and did not recognize the scientific uncertainties reflected in the regional stock status report. Hutchings et al. should realize that DFO's policy requiring objective, balanced statements must be implemented to be effective. They criticize statements that ignore uncertainty and variability in scientific opinion yet criticize the Department for asking a scientist to present a balanced view. Stock status reports Hutchings et al. (1997 Hutchings et al. ( , p. 1997 claim that stock status reports by DFO are biased, in particular that the 1995 stock status report for Newfoundland Region (DFO 1995a) makes almost no mention of the potential influence of fishing on the groundfish collapse. The quotation is selective (part of one sentence) and misrepresents what the stock status report said. A more complete quotation shows that overfishing is given major attention in a balanced discussion.
"Ecological Perspectives
An important research activity is that of trying to relate all of the different observations described above; in other words to look at, and try to better understand the ecosystem. This is a difficult task, and we have a long way to go. However, based on our current information we can begin to see some similarities and differences, and begin to ask questions.
For example, we may ask why so many of the "traditional" groundfish resources around Newfoundland declined at about the same time. For some of these such as the transboundary Grand Banks stocks of redfish (3LN), cod (3NO), yellowtail flounder (3LNO), witch flounder (3NO) and the southern component of 3LNO American plaice, the cause appears to be more related to overfishing, particularly on the young, immature sizes. The picture does not appear to be as clear for the other stocks. Both fishery and nonfishery causes have been put forward, and the relative importance of each may vary between stocks.
For northern cod, there are differences of opinion. While some strongly advocate that the decline can be fully explained by fishing, others believe there was an important environmental component that must not be ignored." Hutchings et al. (1997) also criticize the 1995 stock status report on Gulf of St. Lawrence groundfish (DFO 1995b), implying that seal predation rather than high fishing mortality was falsely being presented as the cause of the decline in southern Gulf cod. Here is what the report said about fishing mortality: "According to surveys, total mortality varied between 0.45 and 0.80 in the early 1970s to mid 1980s. There was a sharp increase in the late 1980s to levels greater than 1.0. The final estimate, which was for the 1990 to 1994 period, indicated a decline. This trend corresponds well with the trend in cod directed fishing effort and most likely reflects variations in mortality due to fishing" (p. 36).
"Fishing mortality averaged approximately 0.6 up to 1988 (Figure 3 .2.7) but then increased to around 1.0 in 1992. Fishing effort was reduced markedly in 1993 with the closure of the fishery. The catch of slightly above 5,000 t in 1993 resulted in a fishing mortality near the F0.1 = 0.2 reference level" (p. 37).
"The current management system did not prevent the high level of fishing that was exerted on this stock in the 1989-92 period and the ensuing stock crash. Only one quarter of the historical fishing effort will be required to harvest the resource if it does recover. In the initial years of the recovery, fishing should occur well below this level. Reopening the fishery to the same fishing fleet and using the same management approach as before will likely result in immediate overfishing of the stock" (p. 38).
The stock status report for southern Gulf cod (DFO 1995b) does not mention seals at all and makes the above clear and strong statements about fishing mortality. How could Hutchings et al. (1997 Hutchings et al. ( , p. 1203 conclude that seals are being blamed for the decline of southern Gulf cod? This is clearly a gross misunderstanding of the report.
The 1996 overview presentation on Atlantic groundfish (DFO 1996) , which was shown to the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in June 1996 and used in a video distributed across Atlantic Canada, was very clear about the reasons for the declines of Atlantic groundfish: "Contributing factors:
• Domestic and Foreign overfishing • Poor fishing practices such as dumping and discarding • Unfavorable environmental conditions • Increased natural mortality" This is the message communicated to the public; overfishing and poor fishing practices are the top two factors.
Kemano completion project
The events surrounding this matter are now a decade old and have been scrutinized through a number of mechanisms, perhaps most thoroughly through the eight months of technical hearings by the British Columbia Utilities Commission in 1993 -1994 (BCUC 1994 . Hutchings et al. (1997) quote selectively from documentation made public and provided to the Commission to build a case that DFO suppressed differing views of its scientists during the negotiation of a settlement of its court case. DFO provided over 100 000 pages of material from its files and encouraged any of its employees to testify before the inquiry. Opponents of the project were invited to name DFO witnesses that they wished to testify. All requested witnesses participated in the hearings. A wide range of views was expressed in the documents submitted and in the testimony of DFO employees. Hutchings et al. have been entirely one sided in their selection of testimony. The Commission's report was similar to, but more cautious than, the Settlement Agreement:
"For the chinook and trout or the Nechako River, the Commission was not satisfied that the provisions of the Settlement Agreement were adequate, but was unable to set a precise estimate on the single level of flow that would be best." (BCUC 1994, p. xxiii) The Commission concluded, with respect to the protection of fish and fish habitat, that to allow greater certainty, the program of habitat complexes should be replaced by somewhat greater flows and (or) hatchery operations. They then proposed three combinations of modestly higher flows, all less than existing flows provided under the 1987 settlement agreement, together with hatchery operations. They also concluded that the temperature used to trigger the release of cooling flows to protect migrating sockeye salmon should be decreased by 1 degree, from 19.4 to 18.4 degrees.
Summary
Contrary to the argument of Hutchings et al. (1997) , DFO invited independent examination of the assessment of the northern cod stock and followed the advice of the Independent review of the state of the northern cod stock. Rather than suppressing information about the importance of high fishing mortalities in the decline of Atlantic groundfish, DFO stock status reports have highlighted its importance. DFO encouraged staff with a wide range of views to testify at the major BCUC inquiry. DFO's peer review system for stock assessments involves external reviewers who see the data and know the conclusions reached before DFO managers. We consider that the peer review process in place for Canadian fish stock assessments is as good or better than other systems in use elsewhere in the world.
